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Abstract 
 
In extant literature, ‘escalation of commitment’ is 
viewed as a recommitment of resources to a failing 
course of action that can lock projects into an ill-fated 
path of failure. This view portrays all feedback 
information driving recommitment decisions as 
“negative” in nature. In this paper we question this 
portrayal, joining an emerging alternative view that 
makes no assumptions about the nature of feedback. 
We take the view that feedback is inherently equivocal, 
and regard escalation of commitment as decision 
dilemmas arising out of such equivocality. Drawing on 
a case study of a digital government project in 
Indonesia, the paper explores this alternative view by 
understanding the antecedents of escalation of 
commitment deployed by key actors in steering a 
failing project to become a reasonably successful one. 
Theoretically, the paper suggests that the decision 
maker’s dilemma is influenced by their personal 
beliefs, cultural norms and institutional values. The 
paper presents the notion of “perseverance of 
commitment”, where escalation of commitment 
emerges, and is subsequently reinforced through a 
collective belief-driven reframing mechanism.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The well-documented case of Project Taurus, an 
information systems (IS) project commissioned by the 
London Stock Exchange that collapsed after three 
years of intensive work and almost 500 million pounds 
of investment, is a somber reminder of organizations 
unable to stop from committing a series of disastrous 
decisions [1]. Although commitment to a strategy is 
important for successful execution of IS projects, it is 
often problematic when decision makers become 
overcommitted to a strategy which does not yield 
favorable outcomes. The problematic issue arises from 
an impression of “throwing good money after bad”, by 
continuing allocation of resources to a course of action 
with little or diminishing chance of success [2]. This 
phenomenon of continuous or escalating commitment, 
where decision makers recommit resources to a failing 
course of action [3], has been an interest of 
management researchers for more than 40 years. The 
enduring interest, particularly in the field of IS project 
management, partly comes from the link between 
escalation of commitment and failing project situations 
as well as project outcomes [4]. Therefore, there is a 
significant body of work on escalation of commitment, 
which is extending our understanding on why and how 
this overcommitment happens in various contexts [5]. 
Early literature of escalation of commitment 
describe it as a “syndrome of decision errors” leading 
to a recommitment to a failing course of action. There 
are three elements of escalation of commitment: (a) a 
series of behaviors linking together as a course of 
action toward a goal-state; (b) feedback that the course 
of action is not achieving the goal-state (negative 
feedback); and (c) there is an opportunity for making 
decision on further allocation of resources to the same 
course of action [3]. “Decision errors” happens when 
decision makers continue the allocation of resource to 
a course of action despite the feedback that the course 
of action does not achieve the goal-state. Several 
theories of escalation offer explanations of such 
“decision errors” from the perspectives of 
psychological and social justification (self-justification 
theory) [6, 7], goal incongruency and information 
asymmetry (agency theory) [8], sunk cost (prospect 
theory) [9], and completion effect (approach avoidance 
theory) [10]. In this view of escalation of commitment 
as the result of decision errors, escalation is likely to 
make a failing project fail further unless escalation of 
commitment is interrupted or de-escalated, or the 
project is abandoned. 
However, there is an alternative view of escalation 
of commitment, which challenges the assumption of 
reliability on “negative feedback” because reliable or 
complete information on the feedback or the outcome 
from a course of action may not always available to 
decision makers [11]. When feedback information is 
unreliable or incomplete, feedback becomes equivocal 
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which leads to a possibility for having multiple 
interpretations of the feedback (negative, positive, or 
ambiguous). So, a failing course of action may still be 
perceived as having positive feedback. Bowen [11] 
suggests that escalation of commitment is a “decision 
dilemma”, as decision makers continue the same 
course of action because that is the best option based 
on the equivocal feedback available to them. The 
consequence of equivocal feedback is that it is almost 
impossible to judge if escalation of commitment is an 
error because of the multiple interpretation of 
feedback. Another consequence is that escalation of 
commitment has the possibility for positive outcomes. 
To summarize, most studies adopt the “decision 
errors” view of the phenomenon [see 12, 13]. In this 
view, positive outcome of escalation of commitment is 
unlikely. On the other hand, the “decision dilemmas” 
view suggest that it is possible for projects 
experiencing escalation of commitment to achieve their 
goal [11]. There is scarcity of research on escalation of 
commitment leading to positive outcomes, which 
motivates this study. Specifically, we aim to 
understand the antecedents of escalation of 
commitment deployed by key actors in steering a 
failing project to become a reasonably successful one. 
We attempt to uncover the antecedents of escalation of 
commitment by studying a case of a drifting IS project 
which is turned around back to its track with the help 
of escalation of commitment. 
We conducted an in-depth exploratory case study at 
a digital government project in Indonesian central 
government. Using qualitative interpretive approach, 
our study revealed a process where escalation of 
commitment emerges, and subsequently is reinforced, 
through a belief-driven reasoning which is based on the 
assessment of situation of the project. We suggest a 
notion of “perseverance of commitment”, which is a 
form of reasoned escalation of commitment. Our study 
makes a theoretical contribution to the body of work on 
escalation of commitment by highlighting the 
significance of contextual personal, institutional and 
cultural values in decisions dilemma leading to 
escalation. 
 
2. Escalation of commitment  
 
In its early studies, the commonly used definition 
for escalation of commitment (or “escalation”) is the 
continued commitment in the face of negative 
information or feedbacks about prior course of action 
[3, 6, 11]. This situation is usually accompanied by 
uncertainty on the likelihood of goal attainment [6]. 
However, some studies on escalation of commitment 
challenge the significance of negative information or 
feedbacks [8, 9, 11]. Recent escalation of commitment 
studies adopts a relatively more generic definition, 
which is the act of committing additional resources to 
what appears to be a questionable or failing course of 
action [5]. While the concept of escalation is rooted in 
the field of social psychology [14], it has been studied 
in related fields such as project management and 
particularly in the context of IS project management 
[e.g., 15, 16]. 
 
2.1. Major theories of escalation 
 
The first major theory of escalation is self-
justification theory, which is drawn from theory of 
cognitive dissonance [17]. The main premise of this 
theory is the unwillingness of individuals to admit that 
their previous decisions are failing. A lot of early 
studies adopted this view [e.g., 6, 7, 14] which set the 
reputation for self-justification theory as traditional 
explanation of escalation. Self-justification theory 
views escalation as driven by the need to demonstrate 
rationality of earlier decisions. By escalating their 
commitment, decision makers increase the effort for 
reaching designated goals so they can prove that their 
previous decision is correct, in other words “to make 
good on” prior investments [3].  
Whyte [9] highlights that in some studies [e.g., 7, 
14] the effects of negative feedback and personal 
responsibility are not consistent with self-justification 
theory. He proposed an alternative explanation based 
on prospect theory [18], where perceived outcome of 
earlier decision (i.e., success or failure) determines the 
framing of subsequent decision. With failing decision 
(negative framing of feedback), decision makers frame 
subsequent decision as a choice between losses. In that 
situation, decision makers tend to adopt risk seeking 
behavior, which leads to escalation. In short, escalation 
of commitment is the outcome of the manner that 
individuals frame decisions and subsequently choose 
between alternatives. 
Approach-avoidance conflict can also lead to 
escalation [10]. Lewin [19] defined “approach-
avoidance conflict” as making decision on an action 
which has both positive and negative effects or 
characteristics. Decision of escalation bears negative 
effect in additional allocation of resource, which acts 
as restraining force. Despite that, there is a driving 
force in the chance of achieving the goal. Escalation is 
likely to happen when the cost of persistence on the 
same course of action is outweighed by the size of the 
reward for goal attainment, the cost of withdrawal, or 
the proximity to the goal. As perceived proximity to 
the goal increases, the motivation of individuals to 
achieve that goal also increases. This “completion 
effect” [20] then becomes a driver for escalation. 
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Decisions dilemma theory argues that the concept 
of “negative feedback” is ill-defined [21] because 
researchers evaluate escalation of commitment in the 
context of researchers’ own perception of negative 
feedback. That “negative feedback” is actually 
equivocal for decision makers [11]. Therefore, this 
theory challenges the view of escalation of 
commitment as decision errors or irrational reactions to 
negative feedback. Instead, decision on subsequent 
course of action is an interplay between individuals’ 
degree of commitment to a previous course of action 
and perceived equivocality of feedback for that course 
of action. This theory illustrates escalation of 
commitment as following up on the existing 
commitment to previous course of action in the face of 
equivocal feedback. Equivocality of feedback incites a 
decision dilemma between staying in current course of 
action (escalation) or adopting a different course of 
action.  
We have presented a brief overview of major 
theories of escalation of commitment (Table 1). To 
summarize, there are several views on the motivation 
behind escalation. Escalation has been explained as 
self-motivated action, or a decision between avoiding 
loss and going after gains. Escalation has also been 
viewed as reflection of past events, or anticipation of 
potential future outcomes. There is even a suggestion 
that escalation is basically a decision makers’ response 
to equivocal information, manifesting in a decision 
dilemma. 
 
2.2. Escalation of commitment in IS studies 
 
IS studies on escalation exhibit similar pattern with 
overall pattern of research on escalation of 
commitment. For one, majority of those studies 
adopted laboratory experimentations in their research 
design. In addition to the resemblance in research 
design,  IS studies on escalation also adopted many 
constructs from field studies outside IS, such as the 
effect of sunk cost [22], the framing of feedbacks [23], 
and performance appraisal [16]. Therefore, the 
contribution IS escalation studies mostly have been in 
generalization of these variables as antecedents of 
escalation in the field of IS. 
However, there is a growing body of work in IS 
research that investigates the development of process 
theory for escalation of commitment. Some IS studies 
proposes process of escalation of commitment as stage 
or phase models [24]. Other studies describe process 
within escalation of commitment as a sequence of 
iterative events where actor-networks evolve [25] or 
opposing forces between pro and against persistence 
compete [26]. Some IS studies adopt the view that 
reversal of escalation or de-escalation as an exit 
strategy for escalation situation, and they investigate 
various strategy recommendations for de-escalation of 
commitment [12, 13]. Furthermore, IS scholars probe 
the connection between escalation of commitment with 
institutionalization [27], risk management [28], and 
defective whistleblowing [29]. 
 
3. Research design 
 
We chose qualitative exploratory case study with 
interpretive approach [30] for our research method in 
developing theoretical understanding of escalation of 
commitment in a digital government project. Different 
theoretical views on escalation of commitment and 
diversity of contextual settings suggest that the 
phenomenon is not yet sufficiently theorized. Within 
this situation, exploratory case study is particularly 
suitable to propose new theoretical insights [31]. 
We adopted Grounded Theory Method (GTM), an 
inductive research method which can generate 
substantive theories that are grounded in empirical data 
Table 1. Theories of escalation of commitment 
THEORY 
EXPLANATION 
OF ESCALATION 
MAIN 
CONCEPTS 
ASSUMPTION ON 
FEEDBACK 
OUTCOME OF 
ESCALATION 
Self-
justification 
theory 
Self-justification of 
the correctness of an 
earlier decision 
Psychological 
and social self-
justification 
Negative framing of 
feedback (e.g., 
overruns in project 
time and budget, 
design problems, user 
resistance, 
continuous changes 
in user requirements) 
Without an intervention 
to stop the escalation of 
commitment (i.e., new 
course of action), the 
expected outcome of 
the escalation of 
commitment is the 
failure of the project. 
Prospect 
theory 
Risk-seeking behavior 
in a losing situation 
Sunk-cost 
effect 
Approach-
avoidance 
theory 
Forces driving 
continued 
commitment is 
stronger than forces 
for discontinuation 
Completion 
effect 
Decisions 
dilemma 
theory 
Ambiguous feedback 
drives further 
commitment 
Feedback 
equivocality 
Feedback has 
multiple 
interpretation 
Outcome cannot be 
determined prior to 
escalation 
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from systematic exploration of a phenomenon [32]. 
The benefits of GTM for this study include the 
method’s capacity to interpret complex phenomena 
through socially constructed experiences and processes 
[33], and its accommodation of social issues in 
discovering theory [32]. GTM is also suitable with the 
focus of this study in investigating a process [34]. 
 
3.1. Case description 
 
DGIndo is a directorate general under a ministry in 
Indonesia. DGIndo is responsible for managing 
treasury and accounting of government financial 
transactions. It comprises of 33 regional offices and 
181 field offices, serving more than 20,000 
government working units throughout the country. As 
part of its initiative to modernize treasury and 
accounting of government financial transactions in 
Indonesian central government, DGIndo initiated two 
IS projects, Project N and Project S in 2007 and 2010, 
respectively. Project N is the implementation of a 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) enterprise resource 
planning (ERP) solution to replace the existing in-
house developed government treasury information 
system, which DGIndo uses to provide treasury 
services through all its regional and field offices. 
World Bank provided the grant to finance Project N as 
a multi-year project. On the other hand, the aim of 
Project S is to implement an integrated information 
system (hereafter “StarApp”) for all government 
working units that is fully compatible with the new 
treasury information system which was implemented 
by Project N. Unlike Project N, Project S adopted in-
house development approach and was initially funded 
from state budget as single-year project. In this paper 
we focus on Project S as our study case. DGIndo 
considered StarApp as a significant and visionary 
breakthrough for government financial accounting in 
Indonesia. Prior to StarApp, government financial 
accounting system consisted of several standalone 
applications. Each handling certain function, i.e., 
budgeting, financial commitment, payment, inventory, 
fixed assets, treasury, and reporting. These application 
periodically shared data among each other through 
manual datafiles. This arrangement leads to issues of 
data inconsistencies and required processes of data 
reconciliation and compilation. From the beginning, 
DGIndo envisioned StarApp as an integrated solution 
with compatibility with internal (treasury ERP system) 
and external (e.g., bank, external organizations) 
information systems. The integrated design of StarApp 
also enables government working units to provide 
financial information and reports with improved data 
quality in near real-time. StarApp would also improve 
government’s financial accountability and transparency 
through better data-sharing capability. 
In the beginning, DGIndo set up Project S as a 
single fiscal-year project. It was not long before Project 
S underwent a lot of problems, leading to slow 
progress and missed milestones. At the end of 2011, 
StarApp failed the mandated user acceptance test 
(UAT) because it could not satisfactorily deliver 
several critical functionalities. The decision from UAT 
team was a “no-go”, which means that StarApp needed 
further development before moving on to the next 
phase (i.e., piloting). However, being a single-year 
project, there was not enough time and funding to 
continue the necessary work. After securing another 
financing source, this time from a grant from the 
World Bank, the project continued in 2012. Progress 
was slow and StarApp did not pass user’s acceptance 
test until 2014. The project was still slowly progressing 
when it began a three-stage piloting phase in 2015. 
However, the progress rate of the project started to 
improve as it enters the last stage of piloting phase in 
2017. By the year 2018, all government working units 
of DGIndo had fully replaced the old system with 
StarApp and Project S proceeded to roll-out phase for 
all other government working units.  
The project team of Project S initially consisted of 
a few personnel from development teams of previous 
treasury information systems, who were selected 
primarily based on their knowledge in existing 
systems. Later, the project recruited new personnel 
from DGIndo’s regional and field offices, especially 
Figure 1. Timeline of projects 
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those with experience and skill in software 
programming. Members of Project S are typically 
graduates from the state accounting academy, aged 
between mid-20s to mid-30s. The office of Project S is 
in DGIndo headquarter in the capital city of Indonesia, 
where we conducted the fieldwork. 
 
3.2. Fieldwork 
 
Over a five-month period between June and 
November 2018, we visited DGIndo headquarter to 
collect data. In the beginning of our data collection, the 
initial aim was to understand the case and to identify 
major events. Given the interpretive approach of this 
study, we explored and analyzed the perspectives of 
members of project team on how the project evolved. 
We also attended and observed several activities such 
as project meetings, trainings of trainers, project 
meetings and project team’s conference calls with 
DGIndo’s field and regional offices as well as with 
end-users of StarApp. We were given a desk in 
DGIndo to work, with access to Project S members 
workspaces. This access enabled us to have informal 
conversations with members of project team, and to 
have observations of daily operations of project team. 
We conducted semi-structured interviews with 11 
individuals related to the project. (see Table 2). 
Interviews were conducted in local language (Bahasa 
Indonesia) to allow full expression from interviewees 
in their responses to our questions. We assured before 
each interview that we would keep the anonymity of all 
interviewees in any report that we might produce from 
this study. All interviewees gave their consent prior to 
each interview, which were digitally recorded and 
transcribed before then translated to English. 
Interviewees included former and current software 
programmers, project leaders, project managers, and a 
director. Most of the interviewees had worked on 
Project S since the beginning of the project. All project 
members had been at DGIndo for more than 10 years. 
The interviews began with a general question about 
interviewees role and responsibility in Project S, which 
was followed by an open discussion about their views 
on major events and challenges of the project and their 
involvement in those events. We also discussed their 
perceptions on the conclusions of those events and how 
those conclusions of events influenced the outcome of 
the project. In general, all interviewees spoke freely in 
our interviews, which was potentially in part because 
the first author was an employee of DGIndo, and all 
interviewees were professionally acquainted with the 
first author. In addition to interviews, we also collected 
secondary data from the DGIndo’s official website and 
documentations, internal presentations, audio or video 
recordings from official meetings and project’s 
YouTube channel. 
We analyzed the notes from observations and 
informal conversations, as well as interview transcripts 
to identify themes. Following GTM, we initially 
approached data collection with a broad interest on 
how digital government project takes place in the 
context of developing countries. As our analysis 
progressed, we focused our investigation on the 
phenomenon of escalation of commitment after our 
analysis revealed that escalation of commitment is 
present as a phenomenon with significant importance 
in our case. Through this process, we identified themes 
relating to challenges during the implementation of 
Project S and how members of the project team 
resolved those challenges. We coded these themes into 
three second-order concepts representing antecedents 
of escalation of commitment: “feedback from previous 
course of action”, “leadership ambiguity” and 
“collective beliefs about work ethic”.  
 
Table 2. Summary of collected data
Type of Data Description 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
12 hours of audio interview 
recordings with various 
stakeholders, including the 
managing director, project 
managers, project procurement 
officer, project leaders, software 
programmers, software testers, and 
business process officer. 
Audio and 
video 
recordings 
Audio and video recordings of 
project meetings, video conferences 
with project stakeholders and 
tutorial videos. 
Organizational 
documentation 
Official documents and internal 
presentations 
Publicly 
available 
materials 
IndoDG website, YouTube public 
channel, and government 
publications. 
 
4. Findings and analysis  
 
The empirical data showed that during the time 
Project S was under a lot of difficulties, particularly 
between 2012 until 2016, the project team continued 
their effort despite the lack of significant progress. We 
identified three main themes in our data, which are 
prominent in escalation of commitment in Project S. 
The first one is “feedback from previous course of 
action”, which is in the center of decision making that 
triggers escalation. The other two themes are 
“leadership ambiguity” and “beliefs of good work 
ethic”, both have influences in shaping the 
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interpretation of feedback. Below, we present the 
analysis of our findings. We extend this analysis with 
discussion in the next section. 
 
4.1 Feedback from previous course of action 
 
Feedback from escalation of commitment, hereafter 
“feedback”, refers to information on the outcome of a 
previous course of action. That feedback information 
reflects the performance of the previous course of 
action in reaching its goal state. Goal state refers to a 
desired end state from a course of action. In the case of 
escalation of commitment in Project S, previous course 
of action refers to the decision to develop StarApp. The 
goal state of this course of action is “delivery of 
StarApp which can pass user acceptance test”. 
Therefore, feedback in Project S refers to all 
information that can be used to assess whether actions 
of Project S bring it any closer to a delivery of StarApp 
that meets expected standards in user acceptance test. 
Project S obtained feedback information via several 
methods. The first method was through reports of 
project management such as deliveries and milestones. 
Feedback information from this method suggested 
negative interpretation of Project S progress of action 
toward its goal-state. Project S failed to meet its first 
deadline to pass user acceptance test in 2011. Later, 
Project S also progressed slowly for several years 
without being able to deliver the system.  
The second method of obtaining feedback 
information was through subjective interpretation of 
surrounding environment by members of Project S. We 
found that feedback information from this method 
painted a more positive image of performance of 
Project S. For example, members of Project S assigned 
the perceived higher urgency of the parallel Project N 
as a temporary factor in slow progress of Project S. A 
project leader explained this view: 
 
Because the magnitude of the project N was 
enormous, it was decided that Project N would go 
first until it settled, and after that we can focus on 
Project S. 
 
Another example of positive feedback information 
in Project S is the appreciation from stakeholders such 
as owners of business process. This appreciation may 
suggest that expectation on delivery of StarApp was 
still high. In words of a project leader: 
 
With owners of business process, I think they 
responded positively. Although not as much as 
we hoped, at least we saw significant and active 
responses from key persons who oversaw 
decisions of policy in those units (owners of 
business process). 
 
We found that feedback of previous course of 
action in Project S has characteristics of equivocal 
information. Information from formal assessments of 
project’s progress in delivering acceptable output 
suggested negative interpretation of feedback. Yet, 
subjective assessment by project members of 
surrounding environment of the project hinted a 
positive interpretation of feedback. These multiple 
interpretations co-existed in the assessment of situation 
by Project S. Below we describe the other main 
themes, “leadership ambiguity” and “beliefs of good 
work ethic”, which influence this equivocal feedback 
information. 
 
4.2 Leadership ambiguity 
 
The theme of “leadership ambiguity” refers to the 
uncertainties arising from conflicting messages in the 
actions of individuals in the top management of the 
organization. We observed two types of actions that 
members of Project S perceived as signaling leadership 
ambiguity. The first one is “conflicting decisions” from 
individuals at different levels of DGIndo. The 
conflicting decisions appears to come from certain 
individuals who were not in full agreement with 
development of StarApp in favor of existing systems. 
Since these individuals were in middle level of 
management overseeing some members of Project S, 
they could give directives that in effect held back 
Project S. As illustrated by a project leader: 
 
In terms of work, it’s like there are two suns. 
[laugh] And where would they take us? 
Personally, we have no problem at all, but in 
terms of coordination it is rather difficult. The 
difficulty is because the instructions from each of 
them (in top management) are rather less 
conforming to each other. Ultimately, we 
ourselves got nothing to lose. We did not wish 
for anything, we only wished for clarity. The 
director ordered one thing but echelon 3 (officials 
who are directly below a director) did not give 
the same order. That is confusing. [laugh] 
 
Another type of action is the lack of decision 
making, or “indecisiveness”, that would help clearing 
up the uncertainty. By not making decisions to address 
“leadership ambiguity”, the top management or 
leadership in DGIndo gave space to ambiguity to settle 
down in Project S. This condition leads to a sense of 
frustration to members of Project S, as described by a 
project leader: 
 
In my opinion, to work on two systems; the 
existing system, which is modified to resemble 
StarApp and the StarApp itself, requires an 
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extraordinary amount of effort. Where do we 
want to go, really? That is all we want to know. If 
we want to go for StarApp, then let us focus on it. 
If not, then give us the order, ‘okay StarApp is 
terminated, all of you can return to developing 
existing system’. 
 
The leadership ambiguity has an effect of feeding 
on negative sentiments toward Project S, such as 
confusion on the prospect of reaching the goal state of 
the project, and further frustration from the ongoing 
uncertainty. These negative sentiments boost negative 
interpretation of feedback information. Both the 
lingering confusion and the frustration in finding 
guidance for breakthrough, support a view that Project 
S was a lost cause. 
 
4.3 Collective beliefs about work ethic  
 
The theme of “collective work ethic beliefs” refers 
to a set of beliefs which are collectively held by 
members of Project S. These sets of beliefs shaped the 
way Project S members processed feedback 
information in their reasoning for the decision to 
continue the project (escalation). Essentially, work 
ethic beliefs represent the view of what constitutes 
“good work ethos”. For example, members of Project S 
believe that it is wrong to quit developing StarApp 
because that would be like abandoning their 
stakeholders, i.e., owners of business process and first 
adopters of StarApp. As a project leader described: 
 
We have moral responsibilities. We do not want 
to be judged as opposing existing systems by 
supporting StarApp. But who will handle 
StarApp if we leave it, when it is still new? If 
there are people who can pick up our work, we 
would gladly hand it over. But if there is not, we 
would feel bad for our friends. 
 
This work ethic belief, which resides at individual 
level, later emerged as collective beliefs in project 
level as individuals discovered that they share the same 
beliefs. We observed the collective nature of this belief 
from an incident when project members agreed on a 
collective action to bypass formal procedures so they 
can clarify the uncertainty related to their work with 
Project S.  
 
There were nine of us, and we had discussion, 
and we agreed to send an email, on behalf of all 
of us, to all officers in our directorate. We 
explained that we were not asking anything for 
ourselves. But we were assigned here to secure 
the development of StarApp. We want to clarify 
our status, because we want to do well in our job. 
 
The collective work ethic belief is further enforced 
by existent institutional values in DGIndo. DGIndo 
adopted a set of five institutional values from the 
ministry which is its mother organization. These 
institutional values are integrity, professionalism, 
synergy, service, and perfection. These values are 
widely promoted in the ministry as a set of good 
virtues that all employees should strive for. We noticed 
that some of these values were reflected in actions of 
project members, for example when a project leader 
spoke about “perfection” in his work: 
   
I told to my friends, this is the problem here, this 
is the potential problems. We disclosed 
everything; everything should be thoroughly 
reviewed. No half-baked solutions. With half-
baked solutions there will be more troublesome 
later, we will be troubled by more testing. 
 
The collective work ethic beliefs influence how 
Project S processes feedback information. Since work 
ethic beliefs, as well as extant institutional values, 
represent values of nobility and goodwill, they project 
positive sentiment toward the approach of Project S in 
interpreting feedback information. In other words, 
work ethic beliefs enable Project S to frame feedback 
in a more positive light, despite the negative effect 
from leadership ambiguity, which we have described in 
previous subsection. 
Furthermore, we found some cultural norms exist in 
context Project S, which help Project S to focus on 
positive interpretation. These cultural norms help 
members of Project S in reconciling with negative 
effect from leadership ambiguity. For example, it is 
common in Indonesia to respect their elders or those 
who are older than themselves, and that respect is 
drawn from a common view that older people have 
more experience and thus possess wisdom. By 
adopting this cultural view, members of Project S 
accept that despite projecting ambiguity, individuals in 
senior management has good intentions. As a project 
leader defended this view: 
 
Back then, my superior officer had a different 
view from our managing director on developing 
StarApp. Yet, I felt like there was some truth in 
the argument of my superior officer, because it 
was based on his own experience. And we should 
not blame him, because personally he is a good 
man. I think if the purpose is good then there is 
no reason for him not to support StarApp. It’s 
just that he has different background and that was 
what he thought was best, so that’s why he did it 
(i.e., resisting Project S). And I think that is a 
reasonable dynamic [laughing]. 
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5. Discussion 
 
The above analysis shows the main themes of our 
findings which are related to antecedents of escalation 
of commitment. We present the overall process leading 
to escalation of commitment below (see Figure 2). We 
suggest a processual description of escalation of 
commitment in a project as the reframing of negatively 
distorted equivocal feedback information, which 
refocus the decision-making process to positive 
interpretation of the project. 
We observed that multiple methods for assessing 
the situation of a project may result in feedback 
information with multiple interpretations (i.e., positive 
and negative interpretations) emanating from the 
previous course of action. This equivocal information 
sets up the beginning of decision-making dilemmas on 
whether to continue with the commitment to the 
project. The dubious nature of the equivocal feedback 
information makes it susceptible for amplification of 
either the positive or negative interpretations. 
Leadership ambiguity then amplifies the negative 
interpretation of feedback information, by feeding 
uncertainty and frustration to project members. 
Effectively, leadership ambiguity distorts the equivocal 
feedback information into a relatively more negative 
interpretation (see Figure 2).  
The negatively distorted feedback information 
feeds into the reasoning process of the project to 
resolve the decision dilemma (of whether it should 
escalate their commitment on previous course of 
action), but at the same time, collective beliefs of work 
ethic provide positive influence to the same process 
(see Figure 2). Here, institutional values serve as 
promoters of goodwill which enforces work ethic 
beliefs. Culture of respect also feeds in further 
positivity to the reasoning process. The combined 
influence of collective work ethic beliefs, institutional 
values, and cultural norms of respect enable the project 
to focus on positive interpretation of feedback 
information. Essentially, the project’s reasoning 
process acts to reframe the negatively distorted 
feedback information to a positive feedback, which 
justifies further commitment to the project (see Figure 
2). We term this continued resilience in the face of 
negative distortion of feedback from leadership 
ambiguity as ‘perseverance of commitment’. 
Responding to scarcity of research on escalation of 
commitment leading to positive outcomes, our study 
suggests that escalation of commitment can help 
recovering a failing project by providing a mechanism 
of defense or survival for a project. Through escalation 
of commitment, even low-level members of a project 
can mount a defensive action in the face of leadership 
ambiguity. In the longer run, this entrenchment posture 
may help the survival of the project, by allowing a low 
or nonperforming project to continue until it reaches a 
more favorable performance. Finally, the emergence of 
escalation of commitment in our case study is 
characterized by drawing from collective beliefs, 
institutional values, and cultural norms to summon a 
positive interpretation of the feedback information. To 
that characterization, we posit this positive form of 
escalation of commitment as a form of perseverance. 
The concept of perseverance underlines the nature of 
continued resilience in the face of negative distortion 
of feedback from leadership ambiguity. 
 
5.1 Theoretical implications 
  
Building on the discussions above, we highlight 
several theoretical implications from our study, 
particularly in the context of digital government project 
of a developing country. First, our study provide 
empirical support for the view of escalation of 
commitment as “decision dilemma” [11]. Our study 
suggests that factors such as “leadership ambiguity” 
and “beliefs of good work ethic” may amplify the 
“decision dilemma”. Second, while our study assumes 
the view of equivocal feedback information rather than 
Figure 2. Model of perseverance of commitment 
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a definite negative feedback, one can argue that 
reframing feedback is another form of self-justification 
[6, 7, 14]. In our study, reframing feedback serves as 
justification mechanism in rationalizing a negatively 
distorted feedback information. Third, the adoption of 
framing in our study highlight a resemblance to 
prospect theory [9], where negative framing of 
feedback leads to risk-seeking and escalation of 
commitment. However, we identified different role of 
framing, which is promoting positive interpretation to 
push for continuation of commitment. Fourth, our 
findings on the role of beliefs of good work ethic 
suggests that escalation of commitment as an issue of 
fulfilling certain behavioral standards and expectations. 
Following approach avoidance theory [10], we suggest 
that sustaining negative effect of leadership ambiguity 
as alternative view of “cost”, and moral satisfaction 
from fulfilling beliefs of good work ethic as “reward”. 
As such, our study may compliment approach 
avoidance theory in explaining escalation of 
commitment in government or public sector, where 
concepts of “cost” and “loss” are less tangible than in 
private sector. To sum up, our study suggests an 
alternative explanation of the process behind escalation 
of commitment by highlighting how various actors tap 
into the equivocality of feedback information, through 
either distortion or reframing of feedback. 
 
5.2 Practical implications 
 
The general view of escalation of commitment is 
unfavorable, especially with its association with 
conditions of a failing project. However, there is a 
scenario where escalation of commitment may have 
positive value through preservation in commitment. 
Practitioners might find this study useful in evaluating 
occurrences of escalation of commitment in their likely 
failing IS projects. This study can help IS project 
managers, especially in public sector of developing 
countries, to distinguish between ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ escalation of commitment based on 
characterization of ambiguity of management, 
prevalent collective value-set, and proximity between 
reasoning process for escalation and feedback 
information. Once managers identify the type of 
escalation of commitment, they can consider 
subsequent strategies between managing the 
perseverance of commitment or considering de-
escalation or reversal of escalation. 
  
6. Concluding remarks  
 
Despite general perception in literature that 
escalation of commitment is not good for the trajectory 
of projects, including IS projects, our study of a digital 
government project in Indonesia suggest that it may 
not always be the case. While some escalation studies 
have challenged the assumption behind escalation of 
commitment, our study takes a further step by 
understanding how escalation of commitment may not 
always be a questionable act but rather a force of good 
through a value-driven reasoning. Using military 
analogy with our study case, escalation of commitment 
rather acts as entrenchment strategy that serves as 
beachhead for turning a runaway project around toward 
the intended direction. Escalation of commitment may 
be successful when initiated from the segment of the 
project with value-driven individuals with good 
assessment of situation on the ground, followed by 
reiterated process that enables perseverance of 
commitment to grow into mobilization of support. 
We acknowledge that this study has its limitation. 
The model is relatively a bird-eye view of the process 
behind escalation of commitment. We intend to extend 
our study by exploring further the reasoning 
mechanisms involved in our process model. The study 
is also based on one study case, therefore future similar 
studies in different context may improve or extend our 
model.  
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